Cool Bunny

“The ability to evaluate the situation objectively has always been the sign of true leadership.”   General Frido von Senger und Etterlin

The real question related to Iraq is that of the “tipping point”; i.e. the point where the cost of continued commitment is no longer acceptable, where any hope of achieving even modest objectives has been overtaken by negative reality on the ground.  Have we reached or passed that point in Iraq?   We don’t know, but it’s clear the Bush administration and its supporters do not even want to have that discussion, hence the appeals to “stay the course” (accompanied by less visible White House prayers that the situation doesn’t go completely bad before they leave office) along with simplistic accusations of “cut and run” being leveled against challengers.
    
The Republican Party will unquestionably play the terrorism card this fall, seeking to universally paint Democratic candidates as “cut and run” appeasers.   In order to counter such tactics, a somewhat nuanced position on Iraq and the fight with Islamist terrorism is desirable.   In particular, turning Republican accusations around by calling for a broad debate over policy and criticizing the lack of any coherent anti-terrorism strategy, may offer a useful counter to the inevitable partisan attacks.   

Whether we should have invaded Iraq in the first place is certainly debatable, but now irrelevant.    We’re there.   While there is clearly growing public discomfort with that commitment, the American people are also skeptical of any policy which simply abandons Iraq to whatever fate might be in store.   Recent Gallup Polls indicate that Americans are divided on the war, largely along partisan lines. Yet despite a sense that the war is not going well for the United States, only about one in five favors an immediate withdrawal of troops. Most support gradual withdrawal of troops, preferably within a year, but close to half may be willing to keep troops there longer to achieve U.S. goals, assuming of course that such objectives are in fact still realizable.

A change in policy should not lead to a worse situation than already exists and therein lies the danger in a policy of rapid withdrawal: the sudden departure of US forces from Iraq may well lead to a worse situation.   At a minimum, It would further harm the U.S. image abroad, already severely undermined by the Bush administration’s feckless diplomacy and arrogant unilateralism.   For better or worse, American credibility, prestige and image are at stake here.   The Bush administration has not done well in terms of the psychological side of the conflict with Islamist fanaticism; i.e. the effort to win “hearts and minds.”    A precipitous departure from Iraq will further damage that effort, leaving friends in the region skeptical of our seriousness, and allowing enemies to claim a great victory.   The propaganda consequences of a forced or abrupt withdrawal can only make the broader struggle with Islamic fanaticism in the region more difficult.

A second likely consequence of a rapid withdrawal is that it will almost certainly be followed by full-scale civil war between Sunni and Shi’a, with the Kurds moving quickly toward de facto if not de jure independence.   This will open the door to increased Iranian influence and power in the region, even more than what Teheran has already achieved in recent months.   The ensuing chaos may well lead to widespread instability and insecurity throughout the region.

Finally, a rapid U.S. retreat from Iraq will create conditions in which al Qaeda and similar Islamist terrorist movements will find not only sanctuary but a ready audience and recruiting pool.   The net result will be a Middle East that is even more unstable, more dangerous, and more threatening than the mess we already have.

If we leave quickly, we are likely to find ourselves having to go back again in a decade or less, at greater cost and after far more death and destruction has been visited not only on the people of the region, but on the United States as well.    Having said the above, one must be cognizant of the possibility that all the negative consequences will come to pass no matter what we do in Iraq from here on out, that we have already passed the “tipping point” and the dangers of withdrawal are now exceeded by the costs of staying.   Thus, the need for a serious examination of where things stand in Iraq now.

The accusation of being a “Cut and run Democrat” resonates with the public, despite the fact that it is a simplistic description of what most Democratic candidates would actually propose.    It is a handy slogan that permits Karl Rove to change the subject from “what can we do to manage and perhaps improve the ultimate outcome in Iraq” to a false accusation of Democratic weakness.    By changing the subject and focus, it also obfuscates the reality of the administration’s “Stay and Pray”strategy.

What America needs is a serious discussion about what is achievable in Iraq, what milestones or measurements might mark progress toward those objectives, and whether in fact there are realistic strategic goals still obtainable there.    Iraq may already have passed beyond the tipping point, and no amount of further bloodshed or treasure will allow us to accomplish even the most modest of objectives, but at some point there must be a realistic calculation of cost versus benefit.   In order to make that judgment, however, we need honesty about the situation in Iraq, not partisan rhetoric and dewy-eyed optimism contradicted by the realities on the ground.   

The recent deluge of assessments and revelations, from the Devlin Report and the recently discussed NIE, to Bob Woodward’s new book “State of Denial,” and the still deferred NIE on Iraq itself, all suggest that the optimism of the Bush administration is misplaced at best and dishonest at worst.    The continued inability of the elected Iraqi government to cleanse the police and Interior Ministry of militias and criminal elements is not encouraging.    Prime Minister Maliki remains a weak leader, dependent on the same political elements who are connected to the militias and private security forces.   His ability to bring about real change, and to create an effective central government remains in doubt.    Our own military is expressing doubts about the long-term viability of our effort in Iraq.  

Clearly current policy, as set and adhered to by the Bush administration isn’t working well.   Troop levels are the highest they’ve been since we invaded Iraq, with no sign of relief in sight.   The administration has created a stalemate machine, in which the insurgents can’t win, the sectarian violence is kept from exploding into full-scale civil war, and the US/Iraqi government makes little or no progress toward a stable and secure Iraq.
        
The mess in Iraq is the result of going to war without a clear strategic understanding of what we were doing.   It was a brilliant tactical success but, as Thomas Ricks describes in his recent book Fiasco, the Bush administration never had a clear strategic plan for Iraq beyond removing Saddam Hussein, nor a coherent strategic plan for fighting Islamist terrorism.   Their response to the threat thus far has been disjointed, overly militarized, and reactive in nature.  As a result, we may in fact be losing ground in that struggle.1      

The question isn’t whether to “cut and run” or “stay the course,” it is whether current policy is working, whether there is a clear and coherent long-term strategic vision for both Iraq and the broader “war” on terror, and whether there are metrics that would provide us a better understanding of where progress is being made as opposed to where we are failing.    The rhetorical assurances of the current administration are no longer adequate or even credible when it comes to these questions.    What is needed is a serious debate, and a more cogent strategic vision, one which incorporates all the elements of American power, soft as well as hard, and is proactive rather than reactionary.   The time for that discussion is now.

dtf
29 September 2006

1. cf, the commentary on U.S. Counter-terrorism strategy in Strategic Survey, IISS, August 2006, Routledge Press, pp 29ff)