Cool Bunny

"The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.  Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."  George Bernard Shaw

North Korea appears to have conducted an underground test of a nuclear weapon and the Bush administration responds with.....not much.   If anyone still had any doubts about the bankruptcy of the administration’s policy on North Korea, they ought to be completely dispelled now.    In response to an act that the Bush administration has said would never be tolerated, the administration had nothing more to offer than taking it to the United Nations and demanding international condemnation of North Korea......as if any of that is going to make a difference to Pyongyang.

The only real difference between North Korea’s threat to conduct a test and the Bush administration’s fervent declarations that the United States would not “live with” a nuclear armed North Korea is that North Korean had the capability to carry out their threat and did so.   The Bush administration has nothing significant to offer, and can only hold their breath and stamp their feet in frustration.

The Bush administration’s various declarations that a nuclear armed North Korea would never be allowed are beyond shopworn.   The “warning” that North Korea had a choice between having nuclear weapons and survival is shown to be a hollow threat; bluster perhaps intended for red state America but with no substance or credibility.   It was certainly not a threat involving the possibility of military action since virtually all observers agree there are no military options except really bad ones.   Virtually anything the US might do militarily is almost certain to escalate out of control, engulfing the region in a serious conflict.   Moreover, American military options are rather limited with the bulk of U.S. Army and Marine combat power tied up indefinitely in the Iraqi sandbox.  Last, but hardly least, the proven existence of a North Korean nuclear capability substantially increases the potential consequences of any military confrontation.

The lure of using air power in strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities is illusory.  For starters, we simply don’t know for certain where all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities are located.   We might get lucky and completely destroy their nuclear program, but more likely (given the North Korean proclivity for secrecy, and digging very deep tunnels and bunkers) the best we could hope for is to cripple or set it back a year or two.   In the process, we would hand Pyongyang something to point to as justification for needing nuclear weapons.   Clearly, they would argue, the fact that America is prepared to initiate acts of war against them even in the absence of any overt illegal action or treaty violation would be proof they needed a nuclear deterrent....not that they need much evidence given the Bush administration’s already well-known desire for regime change in that nation.    Iraq was indeed an object lesson about American power and willingness to use it, but it has only confirmed the desirability of possessing nuclear weapons for those nations on Mr. Bush’s “regime change” hit list.

Israel’s recent adventure in Lebanon against Hezbollah should provide a cautionary tale for those who think that air power alone will achieve much of anything.   When the Israelis began their aerial blitz against Hezbollah, they talked of permanently removing the threat of Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets, securing Israel’s northern borders, and destroying Hezbollah as an effective military and political entity....all with airpower alone.   Ground incursions were not part of the strategy or the plan.    After several frustrating weeks, however, it became clear that air power would deliver on none of those promises.    Ground forces were called in, yet after weeks of difficult, bloody fighting, the Israelis were the ones who blinked and ultimately backed down short of achieving their stated objectives.   Air power clearly provided no panacea or easy solution, quite the contrary.   Anyone who thinks North Korea would be an easier target than Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon is truly deluding themselves.

Any military action on the Korean peninsula would likely be carried out without support or even approval of other regional actors, including several of our key Asian allies.   The Chinese will certainly refuse to agree to such actions, nor will the South Koreans be likely to look favorably upon pre-emptive attacks against the north given the potential of a wider conflict.   Both share legitimate concerns regarding the possibility of a complete collapse of the North Korean regime, leading to a humanitarian disaster of considerable magnitude.   

What else does the Bush administration have to back up its tough talk?   Not much.   Talk of sanctions is virtually meaningless.   North Korea is already the most isolated country in the world; there’s not much to sanction.   We could start intercepting and harassing shipping in and out of North Korea, but that won’t achieve much since virtually all of that nation’s meager international commerce comes across the borders with China and Russia.   At best, it would be a harassing action but would not have much real consequence.   Neither China nor Russia is likely to support strong sanctions and even the South Koreans will be reluctant to get tough with their northern cousins, though their previous softer approach is probably no longer a viable policy.    Nonetheless, neither China nor South Korea want to see the collapse of the north any time soon as such an event would inevitably lead to social and economic disaster on an immense scale.   

Other points to be made about sanctions.   Given the relative inability of the U.S. and other countries to impose much pain directly on the regime of Kim Jong-Il the only possible outcome of sanctions will be even greater suffering for the North Korean people.   Since they are in no position to pressure their government, putting pressure on them will accomplish nothing except to make their already miserable lives even more miserable.    The record of international sanctions is not particularly encouraging.   There are no clear examples of such sanctions actually working to effect policy changes if the targeted regime isn’t interested in changing.

The Bush administration might hope the Chinese or Russians will put pressure on Pyongyang, but given North Korea’s willingness to ignore warnings from those countries about conducting missile and nuclear tests, it’s difficult to see why or how any new pressure will make a difference.    Nor is it likely that those governments are going to be willing proxies for George Bush, doing his bidding out of sympathy for Washington’s inability to act.   The Bush administration, with their tough talk, their absolutist demands, and their generally feckless diplomacy, have painted themselves into a corner which they now must sit in.   

What’s left for the Bush administration?   Well, they can continue to talk tough, which seems to be the only way they know how to talk.    But the president and his hard-line advisers.....who will now no doubt have the upper hand in the on-going debate over policy vis-a-vis North Korea.....should remember that tough talk and threats not backed up with action when tested only further weaken and undermine the credibility of those making such threats.   The Bush administration has been all tough talk, but the hollowness of that strategy should now be abundantly obvious.   And when it becomes clear, despite all that tough talk, that the Bush administration will ultimately accept a nuclear North Korea (not all that difficult really, given they’ve essentially accepted it for the past six years), the bankruptcy of a strategy based on hyperbole, rhetoric, bluster and little else will be completely revealed.    Indeed, the only conclusion one can reach about the Bush administration strategy for dealing with North Korea is that it has now been revealed to be a total failure.

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